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1. INTRODUCTION 
The stock-market is essentially imbued with judgments and decisions made by professionals 
as well as private, or as they may also be referred to as amateur, investors. Financial advisors, 
stockbrokers, and newsletter writers issue stock recommendations that may influence 
investment decisions of private (and professional) investors. People entrust their savings to 
mutual and pension funds run by professional investors, like money managers, with 
expectations that these fund would generate high yields and, preferably, break the stock 
market index. Like professionals who issue stock recommendations, money managers may 
base their investment decisions on forecasts, or judgments, provided by economists and 
financial analysts. These forecasts also play an important role for private investors who buy 
and sell stocks on a regular basis. The improvement of information technology has meant 
better possibilities (for instance through Internet) to buy and sell stocks for lower commission 
fees. A new breed of private investors tries to make a living by taking advantage of these 
possibilities. This new breed is often called day-traders, who buy and sell the same stocks on 
the same day. Day-trading takes a substantial part of the activity of the stock-market. Based 
on a unique data set, which consisted of the complete transaction records of all trades made 
on the Taiwan Stock Exchange for four years, Barber, Lee, Liu & Odean (2004) concluded 
that circa 20% of the total trading value (USD 5,672 million) could be characterized as day-
trading completed by private investors. The corresponding percentage for institutions (i.e., 
professional investors and traders) was 0.5%.  
As noted above, the stock-market involves several types of professionals. In principle, 
they are financial advisors, stockbrokers, newsletter writers, fund and money managers,   3
financial analysts, and traders.
2 To these types of professionals, it seems appropriate to 
include day-traders for the simple reason that they attempt to make a living on stock trading 
and, therefore, devote their time to buy and sell stocks in a professional manner. The 
professionals active on the stock-market are often referred to as financial experts suggesting 
that they are highly competent and able to attain superior performance (cf. Wärneryd, 2001). 
It should be noted that they may be called financial experts regardless of evidence that they 
perform well. The present manuscript will from now use this terminology and, accordingly, 
denote stock-market professionals as financial experts.  
A question that ultimately arises is the following: How good are financial experts? 
More specifically, how good are they at forecasting, issuing stock-recommendations, and 
trading stocks? The present manuscript aims to answer this question by reviewing studies on 
performance of financial experts conducted by researchers from multiple disciplines like 
accounting, economics, finance, and psychology. To the best of my knowledge, such a review 
has not been published before. In his excellent primer on financial psychology, Wärneryd 
(2001) gives a three pages long summary on this topic. His summary covers only a handful of 
studies.  
The remainder of the present manuscript is organized into five parts. First, the 
phenomenon of expertise is described. Second, the task environment faced by financial 
experts is discussed. Third, some anecdotal evidence is briefly commented. Fourth, the 
scientific evidence on the performance of financial experts is reviewed. Five, the manuscript 
ends with conclusions of the reviewed studies.  
                                                 
2 This list does not claim to be complete, but aims to illustrate the major part of stock-market professionals. It 
might be argued that the list should also include other types of professionals such as auditors, managing 
directors of the listed companies, board members of listed companies, administrative staff, and technicians 
supporting the computerized trading systems. Admittedly, they influence the stock-market per se, but their 
influence has not the same immediate effects on stock prices as financial analysts, stockbrokers, money 
managers, investors, and traders.   4
2. THE PHENOMENON OF EXPERTISE 
Before moving on, it is useful to give a brief account of the phenomenon of expertise. In 
general, experience and seniority are poor indicators of expertise as these factors have been 
found to be weakly correlated with good performance (Bedard & Chi, 1993). Thus, the mere 
exposure of repeatedly performing tasks does not vouch for excellent performance.  
Broadly speaking, expertise comes from two sources: inborn capacities (i.e., talents) 
and deliberate practice. It is widely assumed that talent is the major and most important 
determinant of expert performance, but an overwhelming body of research emphasizes the 
importance of deliberate practice (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Individuals, who aim at 
attaining exceptionally good performance, must carry out practice activities in a goal-oriented 
and constructive fashion (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996b). For example, 20-year old musicians 
deemed as true experts had devoted themselves to approximately 10,000 hours of 
accumulated practice, while amateurs of the same age had spent only 20 per cent of that 
amount (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993). The significant role of deliberate practice 
for attaining expert performance has also been confirmed in a variety of domains like chess, 
sports, and music; for reviews see (Ericsson, 1996b). At present, few research projects have 
focused on investigating the importance of deliberate practice for reaching excellence in 
business-oriented domains.  
In the early 1970s, Einhorn (1974) suggested that expert judges ought to be able to 
produce reliable and stable judgments. Specifically, he claimed that experts should make 
identical, or at least similar, assessments when faced with identical information; i.e., high 
levels of within-subjects and between-subjects agreement. Several research projects have 
been inspired by Einhorn’s (1974) behavioral conditions of expertise. A meta-analysis 
showed that weather forecasters were highly reliable (i.e., within-subjects agreement = 0.91) 
whereas professionals in auditing, human resources management, and psychology were   5
moderately reliable (Ashton, 2000). In general, research has shown that experts in various 
domains seldom generate better predictions than novices who have received some training, 
and that experts are completely outperformed by simple statistical models (cf. Camerer & 
Johnson, 1991). 
Recently, a new measurement of expertise was introduced. This measurement rests 
upon the assumptions that experts should be able to discriminate among information as well 
as to make consistent judgments and that taking the ratio of discrimination over inconsistency 
can adequately identify experts (Shanteau, Weiss, Thomas & Pounds, 2002). Empirical 
evidence has shown that this measurement seems to successfully identify experts (Shanteau et 
al., 2002). However, the measurement does not take into account the quality of judgments 
meaning that subjects may be deemed as experts despite the fact that they produce 
consistently inaccurate conclusions.  
In contrast, the research program on expert performance takes the outcome of the 
activities performed by experts into account. This research program defines expert 
performance as consistently superior behavior with regard to a specific set of representative 
tasks within a domain (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Technically, superior performance can be 
defined as two standard deviations above the average level of performance in a population of 
judges within the domain (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996a). Note that this definition will not be 
used in the present manuscript as a way to select studies to review. Focus of the research 
program is put on finding stable and quantifiable attributes underlying exceptional 
performance (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996a; Ericsson, 1996b). It should also be possible to 
adequately reproduce the tasks in controlled environments, so that expert performance and its 
underlying psychological mechanisms could be studied with process-tracing methods and 
traditional experimental methodology (Ericsson, 1996a). For instance, while performing a 
certain task experts (and non-experts) may be asked to verbally report their ongoing thoughts.   6
Analyses of the resulting verbal protocols give valuable insights into the cognitive processes 
that occur during the achievement (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). For example, with the use of 
verbal protocol, a seminal study by De Groot (as cited in Ericsson, 1996a) showed that chess 
masters, in contrast to non-experts, were able to rapidly consider a couple of first-class 
alternative moves by just glimpsing at the chessboard; a finding that suggests pattern-based 
retrieval from memory rather than extensive information processing.  
Besides innate and acquired abilities, performance of experts also depends on the 
structure of the task environment. By reviewing findings from multiple empirical studies of 
expert judgment, James Shanteau (1992) has suggested that certain task characteristics are 
associated with good and bad expert performance. In domains characterized by static stimuli 
and decisions about static targets (e.g., weather forecasting and livestock assessment), experts 
tend to perform well (Shanteau, 1992). On the other hand, in domains associated with 
changeable stimuli and decisions about human behavior (e.g., clinical psychology), experts 
tend to perform poorly (Shanteau, 1992). As it has dynamic features (e.g., volatile prices), the 
stock-market seems to fit with the latter domain. Consequently, one might expect that 
financial experts as a group would perform poorly. 
Moreover, in well-defined tasks, experts can rely on their extensive experience and 
outperform non-experts, but this advantage is lost or reduced in unstructured task with the 
result that experts and novices perform equally poorly. This point is illustrated by the findings 
of a classic study of chess involving two types of chess players, masters and amateurs, who 
recalled board positions where the chessmen had been placed in accordance with a real game 
and in a random way (see Ericsson & Smith, 1991). In the real game condition, the masters 
recalled more positions correctly than the amateurs, but in the random condition the two 
groups scored equally poorly.    7
In conclusion, expertise does not only depend on talent and experience but also 
deliberate practice. Task characteristics are very important for experts (and non-experts) to 
perform well.  
 
3. TASK ENVIRONMENT OF THE STOCK-MARKET 
The previous part concluded that performance of experts is not only attributed to inborn and 
acquired capabilities, but also partly due to the structure of the task environment. This part 
sheds light on theoretical and practical considerations of the task environment faced by 
financial experts.  
3.1. Theoretical considerations 
The stock-market is hypothesized to be efficient. Fundamental for modern finance is the 
theory of efficient capital markets that bluntly postulates that all publicly available 
information is completely incorporated in the security prices (Fama, 1991). Once new 
information is revealed, the prices are rapidly adjusted immediately. The prices are assumed 
to mirror the intrinsic values of the securities. With regard to stocks or shares, the intrinsic 
value is basically rational expectations of the present value of the listed company’s future 
fundamentals, which are dividends and earnings growth, discounted for any inflation. 
The movements of security prices are assumed to follow random walks, implying that 
it should be impossible to use current price series to predict future price series. If players on 
the stock-market could hypothetically predict future prices with some accuracy, they would 
be able to profit on their knowledge, but the forces of competition and rationality would 
immediately react and soon the prices would have been adjusted. Thus, on efficient markets, 
there are no opportunities for arbitrage. Or, as put by Brealey & Myers (1996): “markets have 
no memory”.    8
As a result of the so-called random walks of security prices, there is little use of 
attempting to predict future prices on the basis of current prices, because all pieces of publicly 
available information are in fact already considered. Accordingly, it is not possible to 
persistently beat a random selected portfolio of stocks. In other words, efficient markets seem 
to be examples of unfriendly environments with respect to the potentially poor possibilities of 
attaining good performance of experts.
3 
Over the years, behavioral economists have discovered several anomalies in the theory 
of efficient markets. One such anomaly is that prices may follow mean-reverting patterns 
rather than random walks. In particular, it has been found that securities with decreasing 
(increasing) past performance (i.e., prices and returns) tended to rise (drop) in the future 
(Thaler, 1992). The idea of price reversals has not been widely accepted. Supporters of 
efficient markets have argued that this anomaly is an artifact derived by inappropriate data 
analyses (Fama, 1998); an argument that researchers in behavioral finance obviously believe 
is incorrect (e.g., Thaler, 1999; Shiller, 2003).  
Another anomaly is that price movements are linked to calendar effects in that stock 
prices move in persistently abnormal fashions around the turn of the year, the turn of the 
month, the turn of the week, the turn of the day, and before holidays (cf. Thaler, 1992).
4 
Inspired by psychological research on mood, a recent study analyzed stock exchange 
data and weather statistics from 26 countries and found that sunny days were associated with 
                                                 
3 To be more specific, the theory of efficient markets does not really rule out the presence of superior 
performance. Some players on the stock-market may possess private information that is unknown to others. 
Such insiders may be able to consistently obtain abnormally high profits. From a theoretical perspective, it 
should be possible to achieve superior performance without insider information. The theory postulates that the 
average player is not capable of systematically beating the market. Consequently, the players on the stock-
market have different skills with regard to judgment and decision-making. Players having excellent (i.e., above 
average) skills will outperform, or profit on, those players with poor (i.e., below average) skills.  
4 Proponents of the theory of efficient market have argued that it is difficult to successfully exploit the 
anomalies. Malkiel (2003) referred to an experienced money manager, who complained: “I have yet to make a 
nickel on any of these supposed market inefficiencies” (p. 72).    9
greater stock returns (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003).
5 In short, behavioral economists have 
provided evidence that stock-prices are somewhat predictable and that stock-markets are not 
perfectly efficient.  
In conclusion, from a theoretical point of view the stock-market seems to involve 
characteristics that might make it difficult for financial experts to perform well. 
3.2. Practical considerations 
On the whole, the stock-market concerns judgments about the future courses for stocks and 
other kinds of securities as well as decisions to buy and sell stocks. Accordingly, financial 
experts can be divided into two categories. The first category includes those financial experts 
who solely predict the future course of stock-market and related issues such as predicting the 
performance of listed companies (e.g., forecasts of earnings per share). Examples of such 
experts are newsletter writers, analysts, advisors, and stockbrokers. Although there are many 
differences between them, the main task of these experts is to produce forecasts or give 
profitable stock recommendations. The second category concerns those financial experts who 
make decisions about trades and investments in stocks and other securities. To this category 
belong professional and private investors, who not only need to predict the stock-market but 
also make decisions. These two categories of financial experts are consistent with the view by 
Shanteau (1988) who distinguished between advice-giving and action-taking experts. Thus, 
the financial experts face the two kinds of tasks: form judgments about the future or make 
decisions to trade stocks. 
                                                 
5 One might think that a trading strategy based on this observation would be profitable, but such a strategy 
would demand frequent trading and, as consequence, transaction costs would eliminate the profits (Hirshleifer & 
Shumway, 2003).   10
The judgmental task differs from the decision-making task in many ways. First, 
trading and investment demand multiple skills than forecasting. Technically, making 
investments and trading stocks is different. Investors put their money at stake for a longer 
period of time than traders. In this paper, investors and traders will be used interchangeably. 
Financial experts engaged in investments and trading must be able to successfully identify 
potentially profitable securities to invest in as well as correctly determine the appropriate time 
for buying and selling those stocks. In contrast, the task of judgmental financial-experts is 
limited to figure out the future course of the stock-market and the performance of the listed 
companies. Second, forecasting involves far lesser risk-taking than trading stocks. In contrast 
to making poor investment decisions, producing inaccurate forecasts leads seldom to big 
losses. Third, the two tasks are associated with different motivational or incentive structures. 
While the consequences of inaccurate forecasts mainly affect those (often private) investors 
relying on the analysts, poor trading hits the investment experts in an immediate manner. 
Financial experts who constantly make inaccurate forecasts and issue poor stock-
recommendations might in the long run be out of business. However, making too optimistic 
forecasts might be beneficial to the career of a financial analyst in that he/she might be hired 
by prestigious brokerage houses and obtain higher salaries (cf. Hong & Kubik, 2003).  
Finally, it should be noted that day-traders and other private investors, who try to earn 
a living on trading stocks, face greater risks than fund and money managers. The reason is 
that the former group of investors jeopardizes their own money. On the other hand, fund and 
money managers are bound by various institutional and organizational policies that may 
prevent them from following their own judgment. For example, there are regulations for the 
level of risk (i.e., how many percentages that can be invested in certain stocks) that fund and 
money managers can take.  
   11
4. ANECDOTS OF FINANCIAL EXPERTS’ PERFORMANCE 
Popular press has given two contrasting views on the capability of financial experts. On the 
one hand, there exist several anecdotes about their good performance. On the other hand, 
there are several stories of how poorly they perform. For obvious reasons, these pieces of 
anecdotal evidence should be approached with caution, as they may be distorted by several 
factors (e.g., access to insider information and failure of considering transaction costs) 
implying questionable degrees of validity and reliability. Nevertheless, the anecdotes are 
interesting in that they illustrate commonly held beliefs about financial experts. This part 
sheds light on both views. 
Stories of good performance. In year 2002, the Wall Street Journal reported that it 
would end its well-known contest between investment experts and dartboards (Jasen, 2002). 
In this 14-years old contest, the stock-picking skill of financial experts has been compared 
with the performance of stocks selected by darts thrown at the stock tables, as well as the 
development of the Dow Jones Index. Of the 142 monthly contests, the participating financial 
experts performed better than the dartboard and the Dow Jones in 87 and 76 times, 
respectively (Jasen, 2002).  
In two bestsellers, the author Jack Schwager (1989; 1992) interviewed some 30 top 
traders and told their stories. It is unclear on what grounds these so called market wizards 
were selected, but apparently they had attained impressive financial achievements. Among 
other things, some of them had transformed $30,000 into $80 million, scored five consecutive 
years of triple-digit percentage returns, realized an average monthly return of 25 per cent , or, 
alternatively, earned a return of 250,000 per cent over 16 years. No explicit details were given 
about demographics, but a thorough read suggests that on average the interviewed traders had 
roughly 16 years of trading experience and the majority had university degrees. All except 
one of them were male. The bestsellers give comprehensive and interesting descriptions of the   12
reasoning of financial experts. Had the scripts of the interviews been thoroughly analyzed 
(using qualitative methods), it would perhaps have been possible to draw more conclusions 
about similarities and dissimilarities among the interviewed top traders. Nevertheless, 
Schwager (1989, 1992) claimed that the following characteristics were common for the 
alleged expert traders: (1) they employed different methodologies (technical analyses vs. 
fundamental analyses), (2) their methodologies fitted with their personalities, (3) they were 
highly confident about their capability to beat the market, (4) they spent a vast amount of time 
analyzing markets and trading strategies, (5) they took little risks, (6) they believed losses 
were inevitable, and (7) many of them waited patiently for the right opportunity to trade.  
Another example of superior financial performance is the legendary investor Warren 
Buffett, who runs the holding company Berkshire Hathaway. Since he took the helm of the 
company in 1965, the operating earnings per share has increased from $4 to $500 in 2000, 
corresponding to an annual increase of about 18% (Cunningham, 2000). According to Buffett, 
this impressive result originates from allocating capital to businesses with outstanding 
economic records and run by good managers (Cunningham, 2000). Buffett has hinted that his 
success to some extent is due to the fact that he is a student of the pioneer of modern security 
analyses, Benjamin Graham (see appendix in Graham, 1986). 
Stories of poor performance. The aforementioned stories should be contrasted with 
anecdotes where financial experts have performed poorly. Business press has reported several 
instances of poor forecasting by financial experts. Referring to events in the US where 
financial analysts at well-known investment banks had in secret laughed at stocks, which they 
had earlier enthusiastically recommended to the general public, the journalist Noceera (2002) 
argued vividly that predictions and recommendations of analysts could not be trusted.  
Business press has also reported on several stories where pure amateurs have had 
better investment performance than experienced financial professionals. For instance, it was   13
recently reported that a group of British schoolgirls managed to construct a notional stock 
portfolio that resulted in a return of 141 per cent over two month; for the same time period the 
British mutual fund managers had on average a return of 4 per cent and the main index of 
London Stock Exchange fell by 5 per cent (Behrmann, 2003). It must, however, be 
emphasized that the school girls made hypothetical investments meaning that they did not put 
real money at stake and their hypothetical purchases of stocks had no effects on the stock 
market. Consequently, comparisons with performance of fund managers seem inappropriate. 
 
5. REVIEW OF EMPRICAL RESEARCH 
Anecdotal evidence suffers from poor reliability and validity. It has obviously not the same 
strength as scientific evidence on the capability of financial experts. On the basis of searches 
in various bibliographic databases and other sources (e.g., reference lists, browsing through 
journals, and web-pages), I identified circa 35 studies that have investigated the performance 
of financial experts. With respect to their scope of investigation, these studies could be 
divided into four broad areas: (1) forecasting performance, (2) stock-picking performance, (3) 
investment and trading performance, (4) and other aspects. 
5.1. Forecasting performance of financial experts 
Over the years, there have been many research studies on the forecasting performance of 
financial experts. These studies have investigated either the ability to predict the future course 
of the stock-market or the ability to forecast earnings per share.  
Forecasts of stock-market. One of the first published studies on this topic was a 
seminal paper by Cowles (1933). In an attempt to establish whether it was possible (at that 
time) to foretell the future of the stock-market, Cowles analyzed 3,300 forecasts issued by 24 
financial publications during 1928 to 1932. He employed a kind of content analysis – a   14
method uncommon to many modern researchers in economics and finance. The employed 
method meant that three judges evaluated the 3,300 forecasts with respect to the predicted 
degrees of bear or bull market. More specifically, the forecasts were individually interpreted 
with regard to the proportion of stocks investors would purchase given a certain forecast. A 
score representing the return the investors would gain if they completely followed the 
forecasts was calculated for each of the 24 financial publications. The scores were then 
compared with randomly generated benchmarks. This comparison showed that the mean 
forecast failed to perform better than random and that the most successful forecast was not 
better than could be expected by chance. Eleven years later, Cowles (1944) reported 
additional evidence on the failure of financial publications to successfully predict the trend of 
the stock market. In this study, his evidence was based on forecasts covering 10 to 15 years.  
Modern research has confirmed the findings of Cowles (1933, 1944) and, 
consequently, shown the inability of financial experts to predict the stock market. In the early 
1970 Stael von Holstein (1972) performed an experiment on whether feedback about accuracy 
could improve probabilistic forecasting of stock price changes. Contrary to what could be 
expected based on common sense, he found no evidence that the participating financial 
experts made more accurate forecasts after receiving feedback. In fact, an overwhelming 
majority of the participants made worse predictions than a uniform forecaster.  
It might be argued that the experimental-based findings of Stael von Holstein (1972) 
cannot be generalized to the real world. However, an empirical study of De Bondt (1991) 
gives further evidence of poor expert forecasting ability. De Bondt (1991) analyzed circa 
5,400 individual stock index (Standard & Poor) predictions made by distinguished economists 
during 1952-1986. The predictions concerned horizons of either seven or thirteen months. 
Accuracy was measured by constructing econometric models where the dependent variable 
was the (actual seven or thirteen) month-returns and the independent variable was the   15
corresponding predicted returns. If the forecasts were accurate the models would explain 
considerable amount of variance. The discouraging result was that the models hardly captured 
any variance. Thus, the forecasts had no predictive power and were of little use for investment 
strategies (De Bondt, 1991). In addition, it was found that the distinguished economists 
tended to make mean-reverting forecasts; that is after years of bull (bear) markets the 
economists predicted, on average, that the market would drop (rise).  
Forecasts of earnings per share. Forecasting earnings per share (EPS) has also been 
subject for numerous research projects. On the whole, these projects have reported that 
financial analysts tend to consistently produce EPS forecasts that are either too optimistic or 
too pessimistic (Butler & Lang, 1990; De Bondt & Thaler, 1990; O’Brien, 1990). In other 
words, their forecasts are not completely accurate.
6 It has also been claimed that simply 
assuming no changes in EPS may lead to better predictions than those made by financial 
experts (cf. Conroy & Harris, 1987). Accuracy has been measured as the mean absolute 
difference between actual and predicted EPS across a given period and a given firm.  
Criticisms have been raised with regard to how forecasting errors have been measured. 
Since analysts make their forecasts at different dates and update them once they obtain 
additional information like forecasts from colleagues and quarterly reports, they may rely on 
the well-known heuristic of anchoring and adjustment (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This 
heuristic might result in so called recency effects. When controlling for such effects, it was 
found that there were differences amongst financial analysts with respect to forecasting 
accuracy (Sinha, Brown & Somnath, 1997). Analysts identified as superior continued to 
produce superior forecasts in subsequent periods, whereas analysts deemed inferior did not 
remain to be poor at predicting EPS (Sinha et al., 1997). 
                                                 
6 Their optimism might also be a result of the accounting principles by the listed companies (cf. Andersson & 
Hellman, 2004).    16
Research has also tried to link forecasting errors to various characteristics of financial 
analysts like experience, reputation, environment, and information search patterns. As regards 
the relationship between forecasting errors and experience of predicting EPS, there are 
inconsistent findings. On the one hand, with the use of computer-based experiments in which 
60 financial analysts provided one single EPS prediction, (Hunton & McEwen, 1997; Hunton 
& McEwen, 2000) found that experience was negatively and moderately correlated with 
forecasting errors (-.25 < rs < -.41). On the other hand, studies, which were based on large 
data bases of historical forecasts made annually by several hundreds of financial analysts for 
10 – 15 years, have reported that the corresponding relationship is weak and insignificant 
(Mikhail, Walther & Willis, 1997; Clement, 1999). However, firm-specific experience seems 
to matters. Financial analysts, who had experienced several years of forecasting a certain 
industry, tended to make slightly lower levels of forecasting errors than relatively analysts, 
who lacked this experience (Mikhail et al., 1997).  
Another type of characteristics found to be associated with forecasting errors is 
reputation. As a proxy for reputation, Stickel (1992) used membership in a prestigious 
association (i.e., All-American Research Team) and observed that members seemed to issue 
more accurate and frequent forecasts than non-members and that members who were to be 
relegated forecast less accurately than members keeping their status. Unfortunately, Stickel 
did not report to what extent experience, general or firm-specific, was related to membership.  
When commenting upon the paper of Mikhail et al. (1997), which dealt with the effect 
of experience on analysts’ performance, Jacob (1997) argued that improvement of forecasting 
and stock-picking performance over time could be due to institutional background as well as 
incentive rather than solely due to individual learning. Two years later, Jacob, Lys & Neale 
(1999) presented a study that indicated that financial analysts at broker-industry specialization 
and larger brokerage firms had better accuracy As regards the influence of incentive, a   17
computer-based experiment found the following tendencies (Hunton & McEwen, 1997): (1) 
the financial analysts, who were told that their company had an underwriting relationship with 
the case firm, tended to make more optimistic predictions than the analysts, who were 
informed that they would follow the case firm on a regular basis in future; and (2) the analysts 
in the control group tended to make more accurate earnings forecasts than their colleagues in 
the two incentive-triggered groups.  
Finally, two ingenious computer-based studies have investigated the link between EPS 
forecast performance and information search strategies. The studies have shown that financial 
analysts inclined to search information in a direct and selective manner provided better 
forecasts than analysts, who passively process the cues of information as these cues were 
sequentially presented (Hunton & McEwen, 1997; Hunton & McEwen, 2000).  
In conclusion, the reviewed studies suggest that financial analysts are poor at 
predicting the general course of the stock market, but they do provide moderately accurate 
EPS forecasts. Experience seems to lead to slightly better forecast.  
5.2. Stock-picking performance of financial experts 
Investigating stock-picking ability of financial experts is not a recently founded area of 
research. About 70 years ago, Alfred Cowles (1933) analyzed the performance of 7,500 (buy 
and sell) recommendations made by 16 financial service agencies during the period 1928 – 
1932. He found that the raw annual average return of the agencies was below the market and 
could be estimated to -1.4 per cent. Only six agencies managed to perform better than the 
market, but statistical tests showed that this observation was more likely to be a result of pure 
chance than skill. One might argue that the poor performance was due to extra-ordinary 
events like the Great Stock-market Crash in 1929 and the severe recession in the 1930s. 
Between September and November in 1929, the industrial stock index of Wall Street dropped 
from 452 to 224 and in July 1932 this index had fallen to 58 (Galbraith, 1955/2004).    18
Armed with the scientific development of the disciplines of economics, financial, and 
statistics and helped by the improvement of computer technology, modern researchers have 
further investigated the alleged stock-picking ability of financial experts. When evaluating the 
performance of stock recommendations (and investments), control is made for portfolio risk 
meaning that the chosen securities is compared with benchmarks. A commonly employed 
benchmark is stock indices like S&P 500 or the Dow Jones, but index comparisons may lead 
to biased results because the selected securities often have different risk-characteristics 
(Walker & Hatfield, 1996). An alternative method is to find securities that share risk 
characteristics as the ones of the selected securities. The risk-adjusted, or the abnormal, return 
is then calculated by subtracting the return of the matched securities from the return of the 
recommended securities. The core theoretical concept of modern finance, the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), could also be applied when evaluating investment performance. More 
specifically, the risk-adjusted measures of Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen are based on this 
model. Those measures are argued to be conservative tests of performance (Walker & 
Hatfield, 1996).  
Contemporary research has provided mixed evidence on the quality of financial 
experts’ stock-picking ability. On the one hand, there are studies indicating that their ability is 
poor. It has been shown that writers of investment letters do not attain superior performance; 
their abnormal returns are in fact close to zero (Jaffe & Mahoney, 1999; Metrick, 1999). 
Stock-picking ability could also be estimated by other types of publicly available 
recommendations issued by experts, such as stock advice in business magazines (e.g., 
Barron’s Annual Roundtable), newspaper (e.g., Wall Street Journal), and brokerage reports. 
These recommendations seem to be somewhat inaccurate. On average, the abnormal returns 
of such recommendations for a period spanning six months to three year are estimated to be 
around zero (Barber & Loeffler, 1993; Desai & Jain, 1995; Womack, 1996). However, stock   19
recommendations are associated with announcement effects, which are possibly caused by 
buy-pressure from naïve investors, resulting in instant but short-lived average abnormal 
returns of between 2 and 4 per cent (Barber & Loeffler, 1993; Desai & Jain, 1995). After 
about two days the announcement effects and the abnormal returns have completely 
disappeared.  
On the other hand, there are studies reporting excellent stock-picking performance of 
financial experts. Sundali & Atkins (1994) analyzed data from Wall Street Journal’s dartboard 
column, which was mentioned in the introductory section. They found that the participating 
experts on a one-month basis managed to perform better than a stock index (Dow Jones 
Industrial Average) as well as randomly thrown darts by an average of 1.4 and 3.2 per cent, 
respectively.  
Recently, a study reported that investors can indeed profit from stock 
recommendations issued by the average financial expert (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols & 
Trueman, 2001). Specifically, the study showed that purchasing stocks with the most and the 
least favorable recommendations among experts (i.e., highest level of consensus versus 
lowest level of consensus) yielded abnormal returns of 4.1 and -4.9 per cent, respectively. 
Following consensus sell-recommendations yielded also abnormal returns. Investment 
strategies that capitalize on the average recommendation require, however, high trading 
activities. When considering transaction costs, those strategies yielded abnormal returns of 
zero per cent (Barber et al., 2001). Besides, it is unlikely that the general public can profitably 
rely on the stock advice issued by financial experts, because institutional investors are often 
able to trade before the recommendations have been publicly disclosed (Walker & Hatfield, 
1996).  
Furthermore, a study of the stock picking ability of 65 prominent money managers 
(i.e., so called financial superstars) showed that only three managers succeed to outperform   20
the benchmark (i.e., matched securities) for a period lasting about 500 days after the buy 
recommendations have been initially published (Desai & Jain, 1995). For a 500-day holding 
period, the abnormal returns ranged between 16.4 and 4.6 per cent. As the finding could not 
be established with statistical certainty, Desai & Jain (1995) concluded that it is very difficult 
to identify money managers with superior stock-picking abilities. It should be noted that they 
seemed to be slightly better at giving sell recommendations (Desai & Jain, 1995). Thus, not 
even so-called financial superstars managed to identify stocks that performed consistently 
better than appropriate benchmarks.  
To sum up, the reviewed studies paint a gloomy picture of financial experts’ allegedly 
superior stock-picking ability. It appears that the financial experts are, on average, not so 
good at picking profitable stocks. But they generally perform better than chance.  
5.3. Investment and trading performance of financial experts 
Over the years researchers in finance have conducted many studies of the ability of financial 
experts to outperform the market. Their interest is partly due to the quest for testing the 
efficiency of stock market. If it were proven that some investors managed to systematically 
beat (appropriate benchmarks of) the market, this finding would violate the theory of market 
efficiency (Malkiel, 2003). Financial researchers have taken a particular interest in money 
managers, because these types of financial experts have strong incentives to perform well. 
Financial researchers have not explicitly investigated the performance of money managers, 
but rather the performance of their funds. Thus, there is an implicit assumption that fund 
performance is mainly due to the individual money manager.  
Fund and money managers. Some 70 years ago, Alfred Cowles (1933) – a pioneer in 
econometrics - examined how successful fire insurance companies were at investigating 
money in the stock-market. While the average return was negative (-4.7%), he found that five   21
of the 25 examined companies had raw returns spanning between 10.1% and 27.4%. No 
consideration was taken to transaction costs. Cowles’ calculations might not be precise, as the 
theories and methodologies of modern finance were still in its infancy (cf. Bernstein, 1998).  
One of the first contemporary studies found that none of the 115 investigated fund-
managers managed to perform significantly better than expected from chance (Jensen, 1968). 
It should be noted that no consideration was taken to transaction costs. Lakonishok, Shleifer 
& Vishny (1992) analyzed the performance of 341 different money managers during a four 
year period (1985-1989) and found that the average manager did not yield a return better than 
the chosen benchmark (Standard & Poor 500 Index). Another interesting finding was that 
some managers seemed to achieve consistently superior financial performance, but when 
accounting for management fees their performance appeared to be below the benchmark. 
Recent evidence suggests that an overwhelming majority of money managers fail to achieve 
fund returns exceeding the benchmark and that performance is not persistent (Malkiel, 2003). 
The analyses of the funds are associated with a bias of survivorship in that poorly performing 
funds tend to be merged into other funds eliminating the records of unskilled money managers 
(Malkiel, 1995).  
The stock-market is not the only vehicle for studying performance of traders. 
Hartzmark (1991) used transaction records from nine different future markets (e.g., wheat, 
oats, cattle, and bonds) to explore the ability of traders to correctly match their positions to 
the subsequent price movements. On the whole, he found evidence on regression towards 
mean in that traders who perform superiorly (poorly) in early periods tend to achieve poorly 
(superiorly) in the later periods. Across the markets, the number of good traders was lower 
than expected by chance. Hartzmark (1991) concluded that the returns to traders of futures 
depend on sheer luck and chance rather than skill and ability. Furthermore, the market for 
frozen pork bellies was studied in some detail by Leuthold, Garcia & Lu (1994). They   22
discovered that although the majority of the professional traders were unsuccessful, a 
minority managed to correctly predict the course of this market permitting them to earn 
substantial profits.  
In sum, most studies of fund and money managers point to the conclusion that they are 
not able to consistently attain good performance (i.e., outperform relevant benchmarks).  
Day traders. Since the advent of the dot-com industry, much attention has been 
drawn to day-trading, which is buying and selling the same stock on the same day. Despite 
the attention, there is relative little published research on day-traders. In one of the first 
studies of day-traders, Harris & Schultz (1998) investigated performance of 161 day-traders 
using transaction data involving some 20,000 trades over a three week period. Most day-
traders had specialized in trading a handful of stocks and were engaged in high trading-
activity. Mean profit per (round-trip) trade before commission fee varied substantially 
between -$18 and $221. Of the 69 most active day-traders, 52 were profitable before 
commission fee and 35 were profitable after commission fee ($25 per trade). The weekly 
average profit before (after) commission fee was $5,450 ($1,690). Six of the 69 most active 
day-traders gained after commission fee more than $10,000 per week.  
The findings of Harris & Schultz (1998) should be viewed in light of the study by 
Jordan & Diltz (2003), who examined transaction data spanning 20 months from a national 
securities firm specializing in day-trading. They found that the mean net profit of roughly 330 
day-traders was -$7,904. About 73.4% of them made net losses, while 12.2% had net profit 
more than $10,000. Thus, the day-traders of Jordan & Diltz (2003) did not perform equally 
well as those of Harris & Schultz (1998), where the majority made money. Explanations may 
be that the two studies involved different time periods as well as day-traders relying on 
different trading systems.    23
These two studies suggest that a few day-traders are indeed able to profit on their 
trading, but it is unclear whether day-traders are able to consistently make (or lose) money. 
Recall that the research program on expert performance emphasizes that experts must be able 
to perform consistently well (cf. Ericsson & Smith, 1991). To what extent day-traders are able 
to consistently have net profits has been investigated in a recent working paper by Barber et 
al. (2004). Barber et al. analyzed all trades carried out on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) 
from January 1995 to December 1999. Considerable variation was found in performance (and 
trading volumes) of the Taiwanese day-traders. On the basis of their (standardized) past 
profits, the day-traders were clustered into seven categories, which corresponded to seven 
different levels of performance. This procedure made it possible to find out whether the day-
traders were able to persistently earn or lose money. The analyses of Barber et al. (2004) 
suggest that there was a strong relationship between past and subsequent performance. While 
an overwhelming majority (circa 80%) lost money in a consistent manner, a minority of top 
performing day-traders (i.e., 393 accounts of a total of 926,000 accounts) managed to earn 
average daily profits of circa $250 after commission fee. Hence, there seems to be evidence 
for consistent performance among day-traders.
7  
 
                                                 
7 A similar conclusion about private investors can be found in a working paper by Coval, Hirshleifer & 
Shumway (2002). Their study was based on transaction records from about 16,500 accounts at a major discount 
brokerage during 1990 – 1996. Investors classified in the top (bottom) 10 per cent earned (lost) approximately a 
risk-adjusted return of circa 15 (12) points per day. (One point corresponds to approximately one dollar.) In 
other words, the study found that some investors seemed to be capable of consistently earning as well as losing 
money relative to the stock market. Coval et al., (2002) argued that this tendency was not due to possession of 
private information, as it was unlikely that a large number of small (money-wise) private investors would have 
access to inside information in various large companies.   24
5.4. Other aspects of the performance of financial experts 
Besides the reviewed research studies of forecasting, stock-picking, investment, and trading 
performance, financial experts have been investigated with respect to other aspects. On the 
whole, those studies have dealt with judgmental processes and the role of training. 
Judgmental processes. In a classic paper, Slovic (1969) illustrated how a statistical 
technique (analysis of variance) could be employed to investigate information use by 
professionals who make complex decisions. As an example, he analyzed the decision 
processes of two expert stockbrokers, who rated 128 hypothetical companies. The experiment 
showed that the stockbrokers relied on different information, despite that they strongly 
believed that their decision processes were similar. There was also little agreement in their 
ratings (r = 0.32). Three years later, Slovic conducted an additional experimental study. This 
study reported that the participating 13 stockbrokers had little insights into how they weighted 
information as well as had poor agreement (Slovic, Fleissner & Bauman, 1972).  
Recently, Morrin et al., (2002) employed computerized process-tracing to study 
judgmental processes among security analysts. They found that the 19 participating analysts 
differed with respect to decision strategy, information search, raw performance, age, 
experience, and risk propensity. In principle, the analysts applied two types of strategies: 
contrarian and momentum. The former type assumes that because prices are mean reverting, 
one should buy and sell securities whose values have fallen and risen, respectively. In 
contrast, a momentum strategy implies that money is invested in securities with rising prices, 
as it is likely that they will continue to rise in value, and that securities with falling prices are 
sold off. Specifically, Morrin et al., ( 2002) documented that analysts, who had a contrarian 
strategy, were significantly older and experienced as well as spent more time examining 
information but performed slightly worse than the analysts, followed the trend of the markets, 
i.e., a momentum strategy. Morrin et al., (2002) also presented data on how analysts reasoned   25
while processing information. Accordingly, two types of decision strategies had different 
kinds of reasoning. Contrarian-prone analysts tended to maintain their strategies regardless of 
performance, whereas analysts relying on momentum strategies were willing to change their 
decisions and strongly believed that they could beat the market (Morrin et al., 2002). 
Role of training. A study has found that novices, who took part in a short training 
session, managed to solve a set of retirement investment problem twice as good as certified 
experts (Hershey & Walsh, 2000/2001). The trained novices and the experts also processed 
information in a similar manner. Another study showed that novices without instructions 
tended to perform somewhat worse than novices taught to examine accounting information in 
the same active and directed ways as experts do (Jacoby et al., 2001). Recall also the earlier 
mentioned study by Stahl von Holstein (1972) to improve forecasting with the provision of 
feedback about accuracy. It turned out to be unsuccessful.  
 
6. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, the reviewed studies suggest the following tendencies of financial experts. 
•  They have difficulties in accurately predicting the future course of stock market.  
•  Their predictions of earning per share fall often above or below the actual outcome.  
•  Experienced analysts tend to be slightly more correct than inexperienced ones.  
•  Stock recommendations issued by financial experts lead seldom to high returns. 
•  Fund managers seem to be unable to persistently attain returns that outperform 
appropriate benchmarks. 
•  An overwhelming majority of day-traders loses money, but there is minority who is 
capable of persistently earning a substantial amount of money on buying and selling 
stocks on a daily basis.   26
Given these discouraging tendencies, it might be argued that the participants in the 
reviewed studies would not qualify as financial experts. This argument is also fueled by the 
definition of the research program on expert performance. According to this program, expert 
performance is defined as performance that is two standard deviations above the average (cf. 
Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996a). However, the present manuscript has used a broad definition of 
financial experts; a definition that is shared by many earlier research projects (cf. Camerer & 
Johnson, 1991).  
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